# Suspend the Rules and Pass the Bill, H. R. 1228, With an Amendment

(The amendment strikes all after the enacting clause and inserts a complete new text)

117TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION H. R. 1228

To advance a diplomatic solution to the conflict in Libya and support the people of Libya.

### IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

February 23, 2021

Mr. Deutch (for himself, Mr. Wilson of South Carolina, Mr. Lieu, and Mr. Malinowski) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on the Judiciary, and Financial Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

## A BILL

To advance a diplomatic solution to the conflict in Libya and support the people of Libya.

- 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
- 2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
- 3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
- 4 (a) Short Title.—This Act may be cited as the
- 5 "Libya Stabilization Act".

### 1 (b) Table of Contents.—The table of contents for

### 2 this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
- Sec. 2. Findings; statement of policy.

#### TITLE I—IDENTIFYING CHALLENGES TO STABILITY IN LIBYA

- Sec. 101. Report on activities of certain foreign governments and actors in Libya.
- Sec. 102. Report of Russian activities and objectives in Libya.
- Sec. 103. Determination of sanctionable activities of the Libyan National Army with respect to Syria.

# TITLE II—ACTIONS TO ADDRESS FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN LIBYA

- Sec. 201. Sanctions with respect to foreign persons leading, directing, or supporting certain foreign government involvement in Libya.
- Sec. 202. Sanctions with respect to foreign persons threatening the peace or stability of Libya.
- Sec. 203. Sanctions with respect to foreign persons who are responsible for or complicit in gross violations of internationally recognized human rights committed in Libya.
- Sec. 204. Sanctions described.
- Sec. 205. Waiver.
- Sec. 206. Implementation and regulatory authority.
- Sec. 207. Exception relating to importation of goods.
- Sec. 208. Definitions.
- Sec. 209. Suspension of sanctions.
- Sec. 210. Sunset.

### TITLE III—ASSISTANCE FOR LIBYA

- Sec. 301. Humanitarian relief for the people of Libya and international refugees and migrants in Libya.
- Sec. 302. Support for democratic governance, elections, and civil society.
- Sec. 303. Engaging international financial institutions to advance Libyan economic recovery and improve public sector financial management.
- Sec. 304. Recovering assets stolen from the Libyan people.
- Sec. 305. Authority to expand educational and cultural exchange programs with Libya.

#### TITLE IV—DETERMINATION OF BUDGETARY EFFECTS

Sec. 401. Determination of budgetary effects.

### 3 SEC. 2. FINDINGS; STATEMENT OF POLICY.

- 4 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
- 5 ings:

| 1  | (1) The stability and territorial unity of Libya       |
|----|--|
| 2  | is critical to the security of the United States, Eu-  |
| 3  | rope, North Africa, and the Sahel, as well as mari-    |
| 4  | time routes in the southern Mediterranean Sea.         |
| 5  | (2) United States Africa Command                       |
| 6  | (AFRICOM) has identified containing instability in     |
| 7  | Libya as one of its six main lines of effort in Africa |
| 8  | and works to support diplomatic efforts to reconsti-   |
| 9  | tute the Libyan State and to disrupt terrorist orga-   |
| 10 | nizations that impede that process or threaten         |
| 11 | United States interests.                               |
| 12 | (3) According to the Defense Intelligence Agen-        |
| 13 | cy, the Islamic State in Libya (ISIS-Libya) is "de-    |
| 14 | graded". However, AFRICOM continues to "keep           |
| 15 | pressure on ISIS and other violent extremist organi-   |
| 16 | zations as they seek to take advantage of the secu-    |
| 17 | rity vacuum created by the civil war in Libya".        |
| 18 | (4) According to the United Nations, since             |
| 19 | April 2019, the conflict in Libya has led to the       |
| 20 | deaths of more than 500 civilians and the displace-    |
| 21 | ment of more than 200,000 people.                      |
| 22 | (5) Parties to the conflict in Libya have killed       |
| 23 | civilians, committed torture and abuse, committed      |
| 24 | mass extrajudicial killings, requisitioned the houses  |
| 25 | of civilians, targeted medical facilities, and blocked |

| 1  | humanitarian access to food, health, and other life-   |
|----|--|
| 2  | saving services, worsening humanitarian conditions.    |
| 3  | (6) According to the United Nations, as of No-         |
| 4  | vember 2020, more than 574,000 migrants and refu-      |
| 5  | gees remained in Libya and the "continued arbitrary    |
| 6  | detention of migrants and refugees in formal deten-    |
| 7  | tion centers and at informal smuggler sites remains    |
| 8  | a critical concern in Libya". Migrants and refugees,   |
| 9  | including women and children, are routinely sub-       |
| 10 | jected to discrimination, arrest, arbitrary detention, |
| 11 | torture and other human rights violations and          |
| 12 | abuses. The United Nations has called for the imme-    |
| 13 | diate release, evacuation, and protection of refugees  |
| 14 | and migrants detained in conflict zones.               |
| 15 | (7) In November 2019, the Government of the            |
| 16 | National Accord (GNA) and the Government of Tur-       |
| 17 | key signed a Memorandum of Understanding on            |
| 18 | maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean Sea.          |
| 19 | (8) The Department of State's 2020 Traf-               |
| 20 | ficking in Persons Report states with regard to        |
| 21 | Libya "Trafficking victims—including men, women,       |
| 22 | and children—are highly vulnerable to extreme vio-     |
| 23 | lence and other human rights violations in Libya by    |
| 24 | governmental and non-state armed groups, includ-       |
| 25 | ing: physical, sexual, and verbal assault; abduction   |

| 1  | for ransom; extortion; arbitrary killings; inhumane   |
|----|---|
| 2  | detention; and child soldiering Migrants in           |
| 3  | Libya are extremely vulnerable to sex and labor traf- |
| 4  | ficking [and] are vulnerable to exploitation by       |
| 5  | state and non-state actors, including employers who   |
| 6  | refuse to pay laborers' wages.".                      |
| 7  | (9) A November 2020 Department of Defense             |
| 8  | Inspector General report estimated there are ap-      |
| 9  | proximately 2,000 mercenary forces affiliated with    |
| 10 | the Wagner Group, a Russian private military com-     |
| 11 | pany, as well as approximately 2,000 Russian-         |
| 12 | backed Syrian fighters, advanced equipment, and ad-   |
| 13 | vanced capabilities supporting Khalifa Haftar's Lib-  |
| 14 | yan National Army (LNA) and Russian objectives in     |
| 15 | North Africa.   |
| 16 | (10) The most recent AFRICOM posture state-           |
| 17 | ment claims, "Russia continues to harvest benefits    |
| 18 | from the instability in Libya—its military meddling   |
| 19 | has prolonged the conflict and exacerbated casualties |
| 20 | and humanitarian suffering.".                         |
| 21 | (11) The Department of Defense Inspector              |
| 22 | General reported that, "Turkey has hundreds of reg-   |
| 23 | ular military personnel deployed to Libya in order to |
| 24 | train GNA-aligned militias and to operate Turkish     |

| 1  | military equipment" and sent thousands of Syrian     |
|----|--|
| 2  | mercenaries to Libya in support of the GNA.          |
| 3  | (12) On January 19, 2020, at a peace con-            |
| 4  | ference in Berlin, representatives of the Govern-    |
| 5  | ments of Algeria, China, Egypt, France, Germany,     |
| 6  | Italy, Russia, Turkey, the Republic of Congo, the    |
| 7  | United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and        |
| 8  | the United States, as well as regional and multilat- |
| 9  | eral organizations, agreed to refrain from inter-    |
| 10 | ference in Libya's internal affairs, abide by the    |
| 11 | United Nations arms embargo, and advance a 55-       |
| 12 | point communique to resolve the conflict in Libya.   |
| 13 | (13) On February 13, 2020, the United Na-            |
| 14 | tions Security Council adopted Resolution 2510,      |
| 15 | which endorses the Conclusions of the International  |
| 16 | Conference on Libya held in Berlin, affirms the need |
| 17 | for a lasting ceasefire, demands full compliance by  |
| 18 | all member states with the United Nations arms em-   |
| 19 | bargo, and expresses unequivocal support for the     |
| 20 | United Nations Special Representative and the ongo-  |
| 21 | ing United Nations Support Mission in Libya          |
| 22 | (UNSMIL)-facilitated intra-Libyan dialogue.          |
| 23 | (14) On October 23, 2020, the warring parties        |
| 24 | in Libya agreed a ceasefire, which called for the    |
| 25 | withdrawal of all armed forces from conflict lines   |

| 1  | and the departure of all mercenaries and foreign       |
|----|--|
| 2  | fighters within three months, and was hailed by        |
| 3  | United Nations Secretary General António Guterres      |
| 4  | as "a fundamental step toward peace and stability      |
| 5  | in Libya''.  |
| 6  | (15) On January 19, 2021, United Nations               |
| 7  | Secretary General Guterres recommended that re-        |
| 8  | gional and international powers ensure the "depar-     |
| 9  | ture of all foreign fighters and mercenaries from      |
| 10 | Libya and full and unconditional respect for the Se-   |
| 11 | curity Council arms embargo" and urged the Secu-       |
| 12 | rity Council to "give UNSMIL a clear but flexible      |
| 13 | mandate to enable the Mission to support the Liby-     |
| 14 | an-led and Libyan-owned ceasefire monitoring mech-     |
| 15 | anism''.   |
| 16 | (16) On January 21, 2021, the United States            |
| 17 | joined the Governments of France, Germany, Italy,      |
| 18 | and the United Kingdom to remind all Berlin Con-       |
| 19 | ference participants of the need to "continue to sup-  |
| 20 | port a ceasefire, restore full respect for the UN arms |
| 21 | embargo, and end the toxic foreign interference that   |
| 22 | undermines the aspirations of all Libyans to reestab-  |
| 23 | lish their sovereignty and choose their future peace-  |
| 24 | fully through national elections".                     |

| 1  | (17) On March 11, 2021, the United States              |
|----|--|
| 2  | joined with France, Germany, Italy, and the United     |
| 3  | Kingdom to welcome Libya's Government of Na-           |
| 4  | tional Unity and reiterate it will "have the primary   |
| 5  | tasks of organizing free and fair elections on Decem-  |
| 6  | ber 24, 2021, followed by a transfer of authority to   |
| 7  | Libya's democratically chosen leaders".                |
| 8  | (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the       |
| 9  | United States—   |
| 10 | (1) to advance a peaceful resolution to the con-       |
| 11 | flict in Libya through a United Nations-mediated       |
| 12 | Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process as the   |
| 13 | best way to secure United States interests and to      |
| 14 | ensure the sovereignty, independence, territorial in-  |
| 15 | tegrity, and national unity of Libya;                  |
| 16 | (2) to support the implementation of United            |
| 17 | Nations Security Council Resolutions 1970 (2011)       |
| 18 | and 1973 (2011), which established an arms embar-      |
| 19 | go on Libya, and subsequent resolutions modifying      |
| 20 | and extending the embargo;                             |
| 21 | (3) to enforce Executive Order 13726 (81 Fed.          |
| 22 | Reg. 23559; relating to blocking property and sus-     |
| 23 | pending entry into the United States of persons con-   |
| 24 | tributing to the situation in Libya (April 19, 2016)), |
| 25 | designed to target individuals or entities who         |

| 1  | "threaten the peace, security, and stability of        |
|----|--|
| 2  | Libya'';   |
| 3  | (4) to oppose attacks on civilians, medical work-      |
| 4  | ers, and critical infrastructure, including water sup- |
| 5  | plies, in Libya, and to support accountability for     |
| 6  | those engaged in such heinous actions;                 |
| 7  | (5) to support Libya's sovereignty, independ-          |
| 8  | ence, territorial integrity, and national unity con-   |
| 9  | sistent with United Nations Security Council Resolu-   |
| 10 | tion 2510 (2020) and all predecessor resolutions       |
| 11 | with respect to Libya, including by—                   |
| 12 | (A) taking action to end the violence and              |
| 13 | flow of arms;  |
| 14 | (B) rejecting attempts by any party to il-             |
| 15 | licitly export Libya's oil; and                        |
| 16 | (C) urging the withdrawal of foreign mili-             |
| 17 | tary and mercenary forces;                             |
| 18 | (6) to leverage diplomatic relations to convince       |
| 19 | the parties to the conflict in Libya to maintain the   |
| 20 | current ceasefire and persuade foreign powers to       |
| 21 | stop providing personnel, including mercenaries,       |
| 22 | weapons, and financing that threaten to reignite the   |
| 23 | conflict;  |
| 24 | (7) to support the Libyan Political Dialogue           |
| 25 | and advance the inclusive Libvan-led and Libvan-       |

| 1  | owned political process, including elections planned      |
|----|---|
| 2  | for December 2021;  |
| 3  | (8) to support a negotiated and peaceful polit-           |
| 4  | ical solution that includes a single, unified, inclusive, |
| 5  | and effective Libyan Government approved by the           |
| 6  | Libyan House of Representatives, the end of a tran-       |
| 7  | sitional period achieved through free, fair, inclusive,   |
| 8  | and credible elections planned for December 2021, a       |
| 9  | fair and transparent allocation of resources, interim     |
| 10 | security arrangements, and a process for the reunifi-     |
| 11 | cation of Libyan government ministries and Libyan         |
| 12 | sovereign institutions, including the Central Bank of     |
| 13 | Libya, the National Oil Corporation, and the Libyan       |
| 14 | Investment Authority;                                     |
| 15 | (9) to help protect Libya's civilian population           |
| 16 | and implementing humanitarian and international           |
| 17 | organizations from the risk of harm resulting from        |
| 18 | explosive hazards such as landmines, improvised ex-       |
| 19 | plosive devices (IEDs), and unexploded ordnance           |
| 20 | (UXO);  |
| 21 | (10) to support constant, unimpeded, and reli-            |
| 22 | able humanitarian access to those in need and to          |
| 23 | hold accountable those who impede or threaten the         |
| 24 | delivery of humanitarian assistance;                      |

| 1  | (11) to seek to bring an end to severe forms of            |
|----|--|
| 2  | trafficking in persons such as slavery, forced labor,      |
| 3  | and sexual exploitation, including with respect to mi-     |
| 4  | grants;  |
| 5  | (12) to advocate for the immediate release and             |
| 6  | safe evacuations of detained refugees and migrants         |
| 7  | trapped by the fighting in Libya;                          |
| 8  | (13) to encourage implementation of                        |
| 9  | UNSMIL's plan for the organized and gradual clo-           |
| 10 | sure of migrant detention centers in Libya;                |
| 11 | (14) to support greater defense institutional ca-          |
| 12 | pacity building after a comprehensive political settle-    |
| 13 | ment;  |
| 14 | (15) to support current and future democratic              |
| 15 | and economic development; and                              |
| 16 | (16) to discourage all parties from heightening            |
| 17 | tensions in the region, through unhelpful and pro-         |
| 18 | vocative actions.  |
| 19 | TITLE I—IDENTIFYING CHAL-                                  |
| 20 | LENGES TO STABILITY IN                                     |
| 21 | LIBYA  |
| 22 | SEC. 101. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF CERTAIN FOREIGN          |
| 23 | GOVERNMENTS AND ACTORS IN LIBYA.                           |
| 24 | (a) In General.—Not later than 90 days after the           |
| 25 | date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, |

| 1  | in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, |
|----|---|
| 2  | shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees    |
| 3  | a report that includes—                                     |
| 4  | (1) a description of the full extent of involve-            |
| 5  | ment in Libya by foreign governments, including the         |
| 6  | Governments of Russia, Turkey, the United Arab              |
| 7  | Emirates, Egypt, Sudan, Chad, China, Saudi Ara-             |
| 8  | bia, and Qatar, including—                                  |
| 9  | (A) a description of which governments                      |
| 10 | have been linked to drone and aircraft strikes              |
| 11 | since April 2019;   |
| 12 | (B) a list of the types and estimated                       |
| 13 | amounts of equipment transferred by each gov-               |
| 14 | ernment described in this paragraph to the par-             |
| 15 | ties to the conflict, including foreign military            |
| 16 | contractors, mercenaries, or paramilitary forces            |
| 17 | operating in Libya;   |
| 18 | (C) an estimate of the financial support                    |
| 19 | provided by each government described in this               |
| 20 | paragraph to the parties to the conflict, includ-           |
| 21 | ing foreign military contractors, mercenaries, or           |
| 22 | paramilitary forces operating in Libya; and                 |
| 23 | (D) a description of the activities of any                  |
| 24 | regular, irregular, or paramilitary forces, in-             |
| 25 | cluding foreign military contractors, mercenary             |

| 1  | groups, and militias operating inside Libya, at      |
|----|--|
| 2  | the direction or with the consent of the govern-     |
| 3  | ments described in this paragraph;                   |
| 4  | (2) an analysis and determination of whether         |
| 5  | the actions by the governments described in para-    |
| 6  | graph (1) violate the arms embargo with respect to   |
| 7  | Libya under United Nations Security Council Reso-    |
| 8  | lution 2473 (2019) and other relevant Security       |
| 9  | Council resolutions;                                 |
| 10 | (3) a list of the specific offending material or fi- |
| 11 | nancial support transfers provided by a government   |
| 12 | described in paragraph (1) that—                     |
| 13 | (A) violate the arms embargo with respect            |
| 14 | to Libya under United Nations Security Council       |
| 15 | Resolution 2473 (2019) and other relevant Se-        |
| 16 | curity Council resolutions;                          |
| 17 | (B) contribute to civilian death, harm, or           |
| 18 | other violations of international humanitarian       |
| 19 | law; or  |
| 20 | (C) involve weapons of United States ori-            |
| 21 | gin or were in violation of United States end        |
| 22 | user agreements;                                     |
| 23 | (4) a description of the activities of affiliates of |
| 24 | ISIS, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and    |
| 25 | Ansar al-Sharia, in Libya;                           |

| 1  | (5) a description of efforts by the European             |
|----|--|
| 2  | Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),        |
| 3  | and the Arab League, and their respective member         |
| 4  | states, to—  |
| 5  | (A) enforce the arms embargo with respect                |
| 6  | to Libya under United Nations Security Council           |
| 7  | Resolution 2473 (2019) and other relevant Se-            |
| 8  | curity Council resolutions;                              |
| 9  | (B) facilitate a ceasefire;                              |
| 10 | (C) monitor a ceasefire; and                             |
| 11 | (D) support forthcoming elections;                       |
| 12 | (6) a description of any violations of the arms          |
| 13 | embargo by European Union member states; and             |
| 14 | (7) a description of United States diplomatic            |
| 15 | engagement with the European Union, NATO, and            |
| 16 | the Arab League regarding enforcement of the             |
| 17 | United Nations arms embargo, ceasefire monitoring,       |
| 18 | and election support.                                    |
| 19 | (b) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a)          |
| 20 | shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain |
| 21 | a classified annex.                                      |
| 22 | (c) Appropriate Congressional Committees De-             |
| 23 | FINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate congres-   |
| 24 | sional committees" means—                                |

| 1  | (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the         |
|----|--|
| 2  | Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the    |
| 3  | House of Representatives; and                        |
| 4  | (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and           |
| 5  | the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.  |
| 6  | SEC. 102. REPORT OF RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND OBJEC-    |
| 7  | TIVES IN LIBYA.                                      |
| 8  | (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-     |
| 9  | ings:  |
| 10 | (1) General Stephen Townsend, Commander of           |
| 11 | United States Africa Command (AFRICOM),              |
| 12 | warned in January 2020 that in Libya, Russia seeks   |
| 13 | to "demonstrate itself as an alternative partner to  |
| 14 | the West" and seeks to position itself alongside the |
| 15 | southern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-  |
| 16 | zation (NATO).                                       |
| 17 | (2) AFRICOM has also stated that the Russian         |
| 18 | military presence in Libya threatens future United   |
| 19 | States military partnerships and counterterrorism    |
| 20 | cooperation by impeding United States access to      |
| 21 | Libya.   |
| 22 | (3) AFRICOM has reported that the Govern-            |
| 23 | ment of Russia deployed 14 MiG-29 and Su-24 air-     |
| 24 | craft, SA-22 air defense equipment, and mine-resist- |
| 25 | ant ambush protected armored vehicles to Libya to    |

| 1  | support Russian state-sponsored private military       |
|----|--|
| 2  | contractors, including the Wagner Group.               |
| 3  | (4) In January 2021, United States officials           |
| 4  | told the international press that mercenaries affili-  |
| 5  | ated with the Wagner Group were constructing so-       |
| 6  | phisticated defensive fortifications in central Libya. |
| 7  | (b) Report.—   |
| 8  | (1) Report.—Not later than 90 days after the           |
| 9  | date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of    |
| 10 | State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Af-     |
| 11 | fairs of the House of Representatives and the Com-     |
| 12 | mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report     |
| 13 | that contains an assessment of Russian activities      |
| 14 | and objectives in Libya, including—                    |
| 15 | (A) the potential threat such activities pose          |
| 16 | to the United States, southern Europe, NATO,           |
| 17 | and partners in the Mediterranean Sea and              |
| 18 | North African region;                                  |
| 19 | (B) the direct role of Russia in Libyan fi-            |
| 20 | nancial affairs, to include issuing and printing       |
| 21 | currency;  |
| 22 | (C) Russia's use of mercenaries, military              |
| 23 | contractors, equipment, and paramilitary forces        |
| 24 | in Libya; and  |

| 1  | (D) an assessment of sanctions and other                   |
|----|--|
| 2  | policies adopted by United States partners and             |
| 3  | allies against the Wagner Group and its desta-             |
| 4  | bilizing activities in Libya, including sanctions          |
| 5  | on Yevgeny Prigozhin.                                      |
| 6  | (2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph                 |
| 7  | (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may       |
| 8  | contain a classified annex.                                |
| 9  | SEC. 103. DETERMINATION OF SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITIES         |
| 10 | OF THE LIBYAN NATIONAL ARMY WITH RE-                       |
| 11 | SPECT TO SYRIA.  |
| 12 | Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-       |
| 13 | ment of this Act, the President shall submit to the Com-   |
| 14 | mittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives  |
| 15 | and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate       |
| 16 | a list of members of the Libyan National Army (LNA),       |
| 17 | and details of their activities, that the President deter- |
| 18 | mines are knowingly responsible for sanctionable offenses  |
| 19 | pursuant to—   |
| 20 | (1) section 7412 of the Caesar Syria Civilian              |
| 21 | Protection Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C. 8791 note; 133           |
| 22 | Stat. 2292); or  |
| 23 | (2) Executive Order 13582 (76 Fed. Reg.                    |
| 24 | 52209; relating to blocking property of the Govern-        |

| 1  | ment of Syria and prohibiting certain transactions            |
|----|---|
| 2  | with respect to Syria (August 17, 2011)).                     |
| 3  | TITLE II—ACTIONS TO ADDRESS                                   |
| 4  | FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN                                       |
| 5  | LIBYA   |
| 6  | SEC. 201. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN PER-              |
| 7  | SONS LEADING, DIRECTING, OR SUPPORTING                        |
| 8  | CERTAIN FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INVOLVE-                           |
| 9  | MENT IN LIBYA.  |
| 10 | (a) In General.—Not later than 180 days after the             |
| 11 | date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall im-    |
| 12 | pose each of the sanctions described in section 204 with      |
| 13 | respect to each foreign person who the President deter-       |
| 14 | mines knowingly engages in an activity described in sub-      |
| 15 | section (b).  |
| 16 | (b) ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED.—A foreign person en-                |
| 17 | gages in an activity described in this subsection if the per- |
| 18 | son leads, directs, or provides significant financial, mate-  |
| 19 | rial, or technological support to, or knowingly engages in    |
| 20 | a significant transaction with, a non-Libyan foreign per-     |
| 21 | son who is—   |
| 22 | (1) in Libya in a military or commercial capac-               |
| 23 | ity as a military contractor, mercenary, or part of a         |
| 24 | paramilitary force; and                                       |

| 1  | (2) engaged in significant actions that threaten            |
|----|---|
| 2  | the peace, security, or stability of Libya.                 |
| 3  | SEC. 202. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN PER-            |
| 4  | SONS THREATENING THE PEACE OR STA-                          |
| 5  | BILITY OF LIBYA.  |
| 6  | (a) Imposition of Sanctions.—The President shall            |
| 7  | impose each of the sanctions described in section 204 with  |
| 8  | respect to each foreign person on the list required by sub- |
| 9  | section (b).  |
| 10 | (b) List.—Not later than 180 days after the date            |
| 11 | of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit    |
| 12 | to the appropriate congressional committees a list of—      |
| 13 | (1) foreign persons, including senior govern-               |
| 14 | ment officials, militia leaders, paramilitary leaders,      |
| 15 | and other persons who provide significant support to        |
| 16 | militia or paramilitary groups in Libya, that the           |
| 17 | President determines are knowingly—                         |
| 18 | (A) engaged in significant actions or poli-                 |
| 19 | cies that threaten the peace, security, or sta-             |
| 20 | bility of Libya, including any supply of arms or            |
| 21 | related materiel in violation of a United Nations           |
| 22 | Security Council resolution with respect to                 |
| 23 | Libya;  |
| 24 | (B) engaged in significant actions or poli-                 |
| 25 | cies that obstruct, undermine, delay, or impede,            |

| 1  | or pose a significant risk of obstructing, under-      |
|----|--|
| 2  | mining, delaying, or impeding the United Na-           |
| 3  | tions-mediated political process that seeks a ne-      |
| 4  | gotiated and peaceful solution to the Libyan           |
| 5  | crisis;  |
| 6  | (C) engaged in significant actions that may            |
| 7  | lead to or result in the misappropriation of sig-      |
| 8  | nificant state assets of Libya;                        |
| 9  | (D) involved in, or has been involved in,              |
| 10 | the significant illicit exploitation of crude oil or   |
| 11 | any other natural resources in Libya, including        |
| 12 | the significant illicit production, refining,          |
| 13 | brokering, sale, purchase, or export of Libyan         |
| 14 | oil;   |
| 15 | (E) significantly threatening or coercing              |
| 16 | Libyan state financial institutions or the Liby-       |
| 17 | an National Oil Company; or                            |
| 18 | (F) significantly responsible for actions or           |
| 19 | policies that are intended to undermine efforts        |
| 20 | to promote stabilization and economic recovery         |
| 21 | in Libya;  |
| 22 | (2) foreign persons who the President deter-           |
| 23 | mines are successor entities to persons referred to in |
| 24 | subparagraphs (A) through (F) of paragraph (1);        |
| 25 | and  |

| 1  | (3) foreign persons who the President deter-         |
|----|--|
| 2  | mines—   |
| 3  | (A) own or control, or are owned or con-             |
| 4  | trolled by, a person referred to in any of sub-      |
| 5  | paragraphs (A) through (F) of paragraph (1)          |
| 6  | or paragraph (2); and                                |
| 7  | (B) have provided, or attempted to pro-              |
| 8  | vide, significant financial, material, techno-       |
| 9  | logical, or other support for, or goods or serv-     |
| 10 | ices in support of, a person referred to in any      |
| 11 | of subparagraphs (A) through (F) of paragraph        |
| 12 | (1) or paragraph (2) for purposes of engaging        |
| 13 | in any activity listed in such subparagraphs (A)     |
| 14 | through (F) of paragraph (1).                        |
| 15 | (4) Updates of list.—The President shall             |
| 16 | submit to the appropriate congressional committees   |
| 17 | an updated list under paragraph (1)—                 |
| 18 | (A) not later than 180 days after the date           |
| 19 | of the enactment of this Act and annually            |
| 20 | thereafter for a period of 5 years; or               |
| 21 | (B) as new information becomes available.            |
| 22 | (5) FORM.—The list required by paragraph (1)         |
| 23 | shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may in- |
| 24 | clude a classified annex.                            |

| 1  | (c) Appropriate Congressional Committees De-   |
|--|--|
| 2  | FINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate congres-   |
| 3  | sional committees" means—  |
| 4  | (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the   |
| 5  | Committee on Financial Services of the House of  |
| 6  | Representatives; and   |
| 7  | (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and   |
| 8  | the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-   |
| 9  | fairs of the Senate.   |
| 10   | SEC. 203. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN PER-   |
| 11   | SONS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR OR  |
| 12   | COMPLICIT IN GROSS VIOLATIONS OF INTER-  |
|  |  |
| 13   | NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS   |
|  | NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTED IN LIBYA.   |
| 13   |  |
| 13<br>14   | COMMITTED IN LIBYA.  |
| 13<br>14<br>15                                     | COMMITTED IN LIBYA.  (a) Imposition of Sanctions.—The President shall impose each of the sanctions described in section 204 with   |
| 13<br>14<br>15<br>16                               | COMMITTED IN LIBYA.  (a) Imposition of Sanctions.—The President shall impose each of the sanctions described in section 204 with   |
| 13<br>14<br>15<br>16                               | COMMITTED IN LIBYA.  (a) Imposition of Sanctions.—The President shall impose each of the sanctions described in section 204 with respect to each foreign person on the list required by sub-   |
| 13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17                         | COMMITTED IN LIBYA.  (a) Imposition of Sanctions.—The President shall impose each of the sanctions described in section 204 with respect to each foreign person on the list required by subsection (b).  |
| 13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18                   | committed in Libya.  (a) Imposition of Sanctions.—The President shall impose each of the sanctions described in section 204 with respect to each foreign person on the list required by subsection (b).  (b) List of Persons.—   |
| 13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20       | committed in Libya.  (a) Imposition of Sanctions.—The President shall impose each of the sanctions described in section 204 with respect to each foreign person on the list required by subsection (b).  (b) List of Persons.—  (1) In General.—Not later than 180 days  |
| 13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21 | committed in Libya.  (a) Imposition of Sanctions.—The President shall impose each of the sanctions described in section 204 with respect to each foreign person on the list required by subsection (b).  (b) List of Persons.—  (1) In General.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the                                   |
| 13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21 | (a) Imposition of Sanctions.—The President shall impose each of the sanctions described in section 204 with respect to each foreign person on the list required by subsection (b).  (b) List of Persons.—  (1) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congression. |

| 1  | nificant support to militia or paramilitary groups in    |
|----|--|
| 2  | Libya, that the President determines are knowingly       |
| 3  | responsible for or complicit in, or have directly or in- |
| 4  | directly engaged in, gross violations of internation-    |
| 5  | ally recognized human rights committed in Libya.         |
| 6  | (2) Updates of list.—The President shall                 |
| 7  | submit to the appropriate congressional committees       |
| 8  | an updated list under paragraph (1)—                     |
| 9  | (A) not later than 180 days after the date               |
| 10 | of the enactment of this Act and annually                |
| 11 | thereafter for a period of 5 years; or                   |
| 12 | (B) as new information becomes available.                |
| 13 | (3) FORM.—The list required by paragraph (1)             |
| 14 | shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may in-     |
| 15 | clude a classified annex.                                |
| 16 | (c) Appropriate Congressional Committees De-             |
| 17 | FINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate congres-   |
| 18 | sional committees" means—                                |
| 19 | (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the             |
| 20 | Committee on Financial Services of the House of          |
| 21 | Representatives; and                                     |
| 22 | (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and               |
| 23 | the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-         |
| 24 | fairs of the Senate.                                     |

## 1 SEC. 204. SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.

| 2  | (a) Sanctions Described.—The sanctions to be           |
|----|--|
| 3  | imposed with respect to a foreign person under section |
| 4  | 201, 202, or 203 are the following:                    |
| 5  | (1) Blocking of Property.—The President                |
| 6  | shall exercise all of the powers granted to the Presi- |
| 7  | dent by the International Emergency Economic           |
| 8  | Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (except that       |
| 9  | the requirements of section 202 of such Act (50        |
| 10 | U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to the extent nec-       |
| 11 | essary to block and prohibit all transactions in prop- |
| 12 | erty and interests in property of the person if such   |
| 13 | property and interests in property are in the United   |
| 14 | States, come within the United States, or are or       |
| 15 | come within the possession or control of a United      |
| 16 | States person.   |
| 17 | (2) Inadmissibility of certain individ-                |
| 18 | UALS.—   |
| 19 | (A) Ineligibility for visas, admission,                |
| 20 | OR PAROLE.—A foreign person who meets any              |
| 21 | of the criteria described section 201, 202, or         |
| 22 | 203 is—  |
| 23 | (i) inadmissible to the United States;                 |
| 24 | (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other             |
| 25 | documentation to enter the United States;              |
| 26 | and  |

| 1  | (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted                      |
|----|--|
| 2  | or paroled into the United States or to re-                    |
| 3  | ceive any other benefit under the Immigra-                     |
| 4  | tion and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et                     |
| 5  | seq.).   |
| 6  | (B) Current visas revoked.—A foreign                           |
| 7  | person subject to section 201, 202, or 203 is                  |
| 8  | subject to the following:                                      |
| 9  | (i) Revocation of any visa or other                            |
| 10 | entry documentation regardless of when                         |
| 11 | the visa or other entry documentation is or                    |
| 12 | was issued.  |
| 13 | (ii) A revocation under clause (i)                             |
| 14 | shall—   |
| 15 | (I) take effect immediately; and                               |
| 16 | (II) automatically cancel any                                  |
| 17 | other valid visa or entry documenta-                           |
| 18 | tion that is in the foreign person's                           |
| 19 | possession.  |
| 20 | (b) Penalties.—The penalties provided for in sub-              |
| 21 | sections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International       |
| 22 | Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall           |
| 23 | apply to a person who violates, attempts to violate, con-      |
| 24 | spires to violate, or causes a violation of regulations issued |
| 25 | under section 206(2) of this Act to carry out subsection       |

- 1 (a)(1) to the same extent that such penalties apply to a
- 2 person who commits an unlawful act described in section
- 3 206(a) of the International Emergency Economic Powers
- 4 Act.
- 5 (c) Exception.—Sanctions under subsection (a)(2)
- 6 shall not apply to an alien if admitting or paroling the
- 7 alien into the United States is necessary to permit the
- 8 United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the
- 9 Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Suc-
- 10 cess June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21,
- 11 1947, between the United Nations and the United States,
- 12 or other applicable international obligations of the United
- 13 States.
- 14 (d) Exception To Comply With National Secu-
- 15 RITY.—The following activities shall be exempt from sanc-
- 16 tions under this section:
- 17 (1) Activities subject to the reporting require-
- ments under title V of the National Security Act of
- 19 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.).
- 20 (2) Any authorized intelligence or law enforce-
- 21 ment activities of the United States.
- 22 SEC. 205. WAIVER.
- (a) In General.—The President may waive, for one
- 24 or more periods not to exceed 90 days, the application of

| 1  | sanctions imposed on a foreign person under this title if |
|----|---|
| 2  | the President—  |
| 3  | (1) determines that such a waiver is in the na-           |
| 4  | tional interest of the United States; and                 |
| 5  | (2) not later than the date on which such waiv-           |
| 6  | er will take effect, submits to the appropriate con-      |
| 7  | gressional committees a notice of and justification       |
| 8  | for such waiver.  |
| 9  | (b) Appropriate Congressional Committees                  |
| 10 | Defined.—In this section, the term "appropriate con-      |
| 11 | gressional committees" means—                             |
| 12 | (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the              |
| 13 | Committee on Financial Services of the House of           |
| 14 | Representatives; and                                      |
| 15 | (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and                |
| 16 | the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-          |
| 17 | fairs of the Senate.                                      |
| 18 | SEC. 206. IMPLEMENTATION AND REGULATORY AUTHOR-           |
| 19 | ITY.  |
| 20 | The President—  |
| 21 | (1) is authorized to exercise all authorities pro-        |
| 22 | vided to the President under sections 203 and 205         |
| 23 | of the International Emergency Economic Powers            |
| 24 | Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this           |
| 25 | title; and  |

| 1  | (2) shall issue such regulations, licenses, and            |
|----|--|
| 2  | orders as are necessary to carry out this title.           |
| 3  | SEC. 207. EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF             |
| 4  | GOODS.   |
| 5  | (a) In General.—The authorities and requirements           |
| 6  | to impose sanctions under this title shall not include the |
| 7  | authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the im-    |
| 8  | portation of goods.  |
| 9  | (b) GOOD DEFINED.—In this section, the term                |
| 10 | "good" means any article, natural or man-made sub-         |
| 11 | stance, material, supply or manufactured product, includ-  |
| 12 | ing inspection and test equipment and excluding technical  |
| 13 | data.  |
| 14 | SEC. 208. DEFINITIONS.                                     |
| 15 | In this title:   |
| 16 | (1) Admitted; Alien.—The terms "admitted"                  |
| 17 | and "alien" have the meanings given those terms in         |
| 18 | section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act         |
| 19 | (8 U.S.C. 1101).   |
| 20 | (2) Foreign person.—The term "foreign per-                 |
| 21 | son" means an individual or entity who is not a            |
| 22 | United States person.                                      |
| 23 | (3) Foreign government.—The term "for-                     |
| 24 | eign government" means any government of a coun-           |
| 25 | try other than the United States.                          |

| 1  | (4) Knowingly.—The term "knowingly" with                   |
|----|--|
| 2  | respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result,           |
| 3  | means that a person has actual knowledge, or should        |
| 4  | have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the       |
| 5  | result.  |
| 6  | (5) United states person.—The term                         |
| 7  | "United States person" means—                              |
| 8  | (A) an individual who is a United States                   |
| 9  | citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for perma-           |
| 10 | nent residence to the United States;                       |
| 11 | (B) an entity organized under the laws of                  |
| 12 | the United States or any jurisdiction within the           |
| 13 | United States, including a foreign branch of               |
| 14 | such an entity; or   |
| 15 | (C) any person in the United States.                       |
| 16 | (6) Gross violations of internationally                    |
| 17 | RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS.—The term "gross vio-              |
| 18 | lations of internationally recognized human rights"        |
| 19 | has the meaning given such term in section                 |
| 20 | 502B(d)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of $1961$         |
| 21 | (22  U.S.C.  2304(d)(1)).                                  |
| 22 | SEC. 209. SUSPENSION OF SANCTIONS.                         |
| 23 | (a) In General.—The President may suspend in               |
| 24 | whole or in part the imposition of sanctions otherwise re- |
| 25 | quired under this title for periods not to exceed 90 days  |

| 1  | if the President determines that the parties to the conflict |
|----|--|
| 2  | in Libya have agreed to and are upholding a sustainable,     |
| 3  | good-faith ceasefire in support of a lasting political solu- |
| 4  | tion in Libya.   |
| 5  | (b) Notification Required.—Not later than 30                 |
| 6  | days after the date on which the President makes a deter-    |
| 7  | mination to suspend the imposition of sanctions as de-       |
| 8  | scribed in subsection (a), the President shall submit to the |
| 9  | appropriate congressional committees a notification of the   |
| 10 | determination.   |
| 11 | (c) Reimposition of Sanctions.—Any sanctions                 |
| 12 | suspended under subsection (a) shall be reimposed if the     |
| 13 | President determines that the criteria described in that     |
| 14 | subsection are no longer being met.                          |
| 15 | SEC. 210. SUNSET.  |
| 16 | The requirement to impose sanctions under this title         |
| 17 | shall cease to be effective on December 31, 2026.            |
| 18 | TITLE III—ASSISTANCE FOR                                     |
| 19 | LIBYA  |
| 20 | SEC. 301. HUMANITARIAN RELIEF FOR THE PEOPLE OF              |
| 21 | LIBYA AND INTERNATIONAL REFUGEES AND                         |
| 22 | MIGRANTS IN LIBYA.   |
| 23 | (a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Con-               |
| 24 | gress that—  |
| 25 | (1) the United States Government should—                     |

| 1  | (A) continue senior-level efforts to address        |
|----|---|
| 2  | Libya's humanitarian crisis, which has been ex-     |
| 3  | acerbated by the conflict and the COVID-19          |
| 4  | pandemic;   |
| 5  | (B) leverage diplomatic relations with the          |
| 6  | warring parties to guarantee constant, reliable     |
| 7  | humanitarian access by frontline providers in       |
| 8  | Libya;  |
| 9  | (C) leverage diplomatic relations with the          |
| 10 | warring parties, the United Nations, and the        |
| 11 | European Union to encourage the voluntary           |
| 12 | safe passage of detained vulnerable migrants        |
| 13 | and refugees from the conflict zones in Libya;      |
| 14 | and   |
| 15 | (D) support efforts to document and pub-            |
| 16 | licize gross violations of internationally recog-   |
| 17 | nized human rights and international humani-        |
| 18 | tarian law, including efforts related to severe     |
| 19 | forms of trafficking in persons such as slavery,    |
| 20 | forced labor, and sexual exploitation, and hold     |
| 21 | perpetrators accountable; and                       |
| 22 | (2) humanitarian assistance to address the cri-     |
| 23 | sis in Libya should be targeted toward those most   |
| 24 | in need and delivered through partners that uphold  |
| 25 | internationally recognized humanitarian principles, |

| 1  | with robust monitoring to ensure assistance is reach-      |
|----|--|
| 2  | ing intended beneficiaries.                                |
| 3  | (b) Assistance Authorized.—The Administrator               |
| 4  | of the United States Agency for International Develop-     |
| 5  | ment, in coordination with the Secretary of State, should  |
| 6  | continue to support humanitarian assistance to individuals |
| 7  | and communities in Libya, including—                       |
| 8  | (1) health assistance, including logistical and            |
| 9  | technical assistance to hospitals, ambulances, and         |
| 10 | health clinics in affected communities, including mi-      |
| 11 | grant communities, and provision of basic public           |
| 12 | health commodities, including support for an effec-        |
| 13 | tive response to the COVID-19 pandemic;                    |
| 14 | (2) services, such as medicines and medical sup-           |
| 15 | plies and equipment;                                       |
| 16 | (3) assistance to provide—                                 |
| 17 | (A) protection, food, and shelter, including               |
| 18 | to migrant communities;                                    |
| 19 | (B) water, sanitation, and hygiene (com-                   |
| 20 | monly referred to as "WASH"); and                          |
| 21 | (C) resources and training to increase com-                |
| 22 | munications and education to help communities              |
| 23 | slow the spread of COVID-19 and to increase                |
| 24 | future vaccine acceptance; and                             |

| 1  | (4) technical assistance to ensure health, food,           |
|----|--|
| 2  | and commodities are appropriately selected, pro-           |
| 3  | cured, targeted, monitored, and distributed.               |
| 4  | (c) Strategy.—Not later than 180 days after the            |
| 5  | date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, |
| 6  | in coordination with the Administrator of the United       |
| 7  | States Agency for International Development, shall submit  |
| 8  | to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy on  |
| 9  | the following:   |
| 10 | (1) How the United States, working with rel-               |
| 11 | evant foreign governments and multilateral organiza-       |
| 12 | tions, plans to address the humanitarian situation in      |
| 13 | Libya.   |
| 14 | (2) Diplomatic efforts by the United States to             |
| 15 | encourage strategic burden-sharing and the coordi-         |
| 16 | nation of donations with international donors, in-         |
| 17 | cluding foreign governments and multilateral organi-       |
| 18 | zations to advance the provision of humanitarian as-       |
| 19 | sistance to the people of Libya and international mi-      |
| 20 | grants and refugees in Libya.                              |
| 21 | (3) How to address humanitarian access chal-               |
| 22 | lenges and ensure protection for vulnerable refugees       |
| 23 | and migrants, including protection from severe             |
| 24 | forms of trafficking in persons such as slavery,           |
| 25 | forced labor, and sexual exploitation.                     |

| 1  | (4) How the United States is mitigating risk,          |
|----|--|
| 2  | utilizing third party monitors, and ensuring effective |
| 3  | delivery of assistance.                                |
| 4  | (5) How to address the tragic and persistent           |
| 5  | deaths of migrants and refugees at sea and human       |
| 6  | trafficking.   |
| 7  | (d) Integration of Department of State-Led             |
| 8  | STABILIZATION EFFORTS.—                                |
| 9  | (1) Sense of congress.—It is the sense of              |
| 10 | Congress that the Secretary of State, working with     |
| 11 | United States allies, international organizations, and |
| 12 | implementing partners, including local implementing    |
| 13 | partners, to the extent practicable, should continue   |
| 14 | coordinated international stabilization efforts in     |
| 15 | Libya to—  |
| 16 | (A) build up the capacity of implementers              |
| 17 | and national mine action authorities engaged in        |
| 18 | conventional weapons destruction efforts and           |
| 19 | mine risk education training and programs; and         |
| 20 | (B) conduct operational clearance of explo-            |
| 21 | sive remnants of war resulting from the 2011           |
| 22 | revolution and current military conflict in            |
| 23 | Libya, including in territory previously occupied      |
| 24 | by ISIS-Libya, and particularly in areas where         |
| 25 | unexploded ordnance, booby traps, and anti-per-        |

| 1  | sonnel and anti-vehicle mines contaminate areas      |
|----|--|
| 2  | of critical infrastructure and large housing dis-    |
| 3  | tricts posing a risk of civilian casualties.         |
| 4  | (2) In general.—To the maximum extent                |
| 5  | practicable, humanitarian assistance authorized      |
| 6  | under subsection (b) and the strategy required by    |
| 7  | subsection (c) shall take into account and integrate |
| 8  | Department of State-led stabilization efforts—       |
| 9  | (A) to address—                                      |
| 10 | (i) contamination from landmines and                 |
| 11 | other explosive remnants of war left from            |
| 12 | the 2011 revolution and current military             |
| 13 | conflict in Libya, including in territory pre-       |
| 14 | viously occupied by ISIS-Libya; and                  |
| 15 | (ii) proliferation of illicit small arms             |
| 16 | and light weapons resulting from such con-           |
| 17 | flict and the destabilizing impact the pro-          |
| 18 | liferation of such weapons has in Libya              |
| 19 | and neighboring countries; and                       |
| 20 | (B) to mitigate the threat that destruction          |
| 21 | of conventional weapons poses to development,        |
| 22 | the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and the     |
| 23 | safe and secure return of internally displaced       |
| 24 | persons.   |

| 1  | (e) Appropriate Congressional Committees De-           |
|----|--|
| 2  | FINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate congres- |
| 3  | sional committees" means—                              |
| 4  | (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the           |
| 5  | Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-       |
| 6  | resentatives; and                                      |
| 7  | (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and             |
| 8  | the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.         |
| 9  | SEC. 302. SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, ELEC-     |
| 10 | TIONS, AND CIVIL SOCIETY.                              |
| 11 | (a) In General.—The Secretary of State shall co-       |
| 12 | ordinate United States Government efforts to—          |
| 13 | (1) work with the United Nations Support Mis-          |
| 14 | sion in Libya and the transitional Government of       |
| 15 | National Unity in Libya to prepare for national elec-  |
| 16 | tions in December 2021, as called for by the Libyan    |
| 17 | Political Dialogue, and a subsequent political transi- |
| 18 | tion;  |
| 19 | (2) support efforts to resolve the current civil       |
| 20 | conflict in Libya;                                     |
| 21 | (3) work to help the people of Libya and a fu-         |
| 22 | ture Libyan government develop functioning, unified    |
| 23 | Libyan economic, security, and governing institu-      |
| 24 | tions;   |

| 1  | (4) work to ensure free, fair, inclusive, and           |
|----|---|
| 2  | credible elections in December 2021 organized by an     |
| 3  | independent and effective High National Elections       |
| 4  | Commission in Libya, including through supporting       |
| 5  | electoral security and international election observa-  |
| 6  | tion and by providing training and technical assist-    |
| 7  | ance to institutions with election-related responsibil- |
| 8  | ities, as appropriate;                                  |
| 9  | (5) work with the people of Libya, nongovern-           |
| 10 | mental organizations, and Libyan institutions to        |
| 11 | strengthen democratic governance, reinforce civilian    |
| 12 | institutions and support decentralization in order to   |
| 13 | address community grievances, promote social cohe-      |
| 14 | sion, mitigate drivers of violent extremism, and help   |
| 15 | communities recover from Islamic State occupation;      |
| 16 | (6) defend against gross violations of inter-           |
| 17 | nationally recognized human rights in Libya, includ-    |
| 18 | ing by supporting efforts to document such viola-       |
| 19 | tions;  |
| 20 | (7) to combat corruption and improve the                |
| 21 | transparency and accountability of Libyan govern-       |
| 22 | ment institutions; and                                  |
| 23 | (8) to support the efforts of independent media         |
| 24 | outlets to broadcast, distribute, and share informa-    |
| 25 | tion with the Libyan people.                            |

| 1  | (b) RISK MITIGATION AND ASSISTANCE MONI-                      |
|----|---|
| 2  | TORING.—The Secretary of State and Administrator of           |
| 3  | the United States Agency for International Development        |
| 4  | shall ensure that appropriate steps are taken to mitigate     |
| 5  | risk of diversion of assistance for Libya and ensure reli-    |
| 6  | able third-party monitoring is utilized for projects in Libya |
| 7  | that United States Government personnel are unable to         |
| 8  | access and monitor.   |
| 9  | (c) Report.—  |
| 10 | (1) In general.—Not later than 180 days                       |
| 11 | after enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,          |
| 12 | in coordination with the Administrator of the United          |
| 13 | States Agency for International Development, shall            |
| 14 | submit to the appropriate congressional committees            |
| 15 | a report on the activities carried out under sub-             |
| 16 | section (a).  |
| 17 | (2) Appropriate congressional commit-                         |
| 18 | TEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term "ap-               |
| 19 | propriate congressional committees" means—                    |
| 20 | (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and                      |
| 21 | the Committee on Appropriations of the House                  |
| 22 | of Representatives; and                                       |
| 23 | (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations                        |
| 24 | and the Committee on Appropriations of the                    |
| 25 | Senate.   |

| 1  | (d) Authorization of Appropriations.—                       |
|----|---|
| 2  | (1) In general.—There are authorized to be                  |
| 3  | appropriated \$30,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 to           |
| 4  | carry out subsection (a).                                   |
| 5  | (2) Notification requirements.—Any ex-                      |
| 6  | penditure of amounts made available to carry out            |
| 7  | subsection (a) shall be subject to the notification re-     |
| 8  | quirements applicable to—                                   |
| 9  | (A) expenditures from the Economic Sup-                     |
| 10 | port Fund under section 531(c) of the Foreign               |
| 11 | Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346(e));                 |
| 12 | and   |
| 13 | (B) expenditures from the Development                       |
| 14 | Assistance Fund under section 653(a) of the                 |
| 15 | Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.                   |
| 16 | 2413(a)).   |
| 17 | SEC. 303. ENGAGING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITU-         |
| 18 | TIONS TO ADVANCE LIBYAN ECONOMIC RE-                        |
| 19 | COVERY AND IMPROVE PUBLIC SECTOR FI-                        |
| 20 | NANCIAL MANAGEMENT.   |
| 21 | (a) In General.—The Secretary of the Treasury               |
| 22 | shall instruct the United States Executive Director at each |
| 23 | international financial institution to use the voice, vote, |
| 24 | and influence of the United States to support, in a way     |
| 25 | that is consistent with broader United States national in-  |

terests, a Libyan-led process to develop a framework for the economic recovery of Libya and improved public sector 3 financial management, complementary to United Nationsled peace efforts and in support of the future establish-4 ment of a sovereign state with democratic institutions and 6 the rule of law in Libya. 7 (b) Additional Elements.—To the extent con-8 sistent with broader United States national interests, the framework described in subsection (a) shall include the 10 following policy proposals: 11 (1) To restore, respect, and safeguard the in-12 tegrity, unity, and lawful governance of Libya's key economic ministries and institutions, in particular 13 14 the Central Bank of Libya, the Libya Investment 15 Authority, the National Oil Corporation, and the 16 Audit Bureau (AB). 17 (2) To improve the accountability and effective-18 ness of Libyan authorities, including sovereign eco-19 nomic institutions, in providing services and oppor-20 tunity to the Libyan people. 21 (3) To assist in improving public financial man-22 agement and reconciling the public accounts of na-23 tional financial institutions and letters of credit 24 issued by private Libyan financial institutions as 25 needed pursuant to a political process.

| 1  | (4) To restore the production, efficient manage-              |
|----|---|
| 2  | ment, and development of Libya's oil and gas indus-           |
| 3  | tries so such industries are resilient against malign         |
| 4  | foreign influence and can generate prosperity on be-          |
| 5  | half of the Libyan people.                                    |
| 6  | (5) To promote the development of private sec-                |
| 7  | tor enterprise.   |
| 8  | (6) To improve the transparency and account-                  |
| 9  | ability of public sector employment and wage dis-             |
| 10 | tribution.  |
| 11 | (7) To strengthen supervision of and reform of                |
| 12 | Libyan financial institutions.                                |
| 13 | (8) To eliminate exploitation of price controls               |
| 14 | and market distorting subsidies in the Libyan econ-           |
| 15 | omy.  |
| 16 | (9) To support opportunities for United States                |
| 17 | businesses.   |
| 18 | (c) Consultation.—In supporting the framework                 |
| 19 | described in subsection (a), the Secretary of the Treasury    |
| 20 | shall instruct the United States Executive Director at each   |
| 21 | international financial institution to encourage the institu- |
| 22 | tion to consult with relevant stakeholders in the financial,  |
| 23 | governance, and energy sectors.                               |
| 24 | (d) Definition of International Financial In-                 |
| 25 | STITUTION.—In this section, the term "international fi-       |

| 1   | nancial institution" means the International Monetary  |
|---|--|
| 2   | Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-   |
| 3   | opment, European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-  |
| 4   | ment, International Development Association, Inter-  |
| 5   | national Finance Corporation, Multilateral Investment  |
| 6   | Guarantee Agency, African Development Bank, African  |
| 7   | Development Fund, Asian Development Bank, Inter-   |
| 8   | American Development Bank, Bank for Economic Co-   |
| 9   | operation and Development in the Middle East and North   |
| 10  | Africa, and Inter-American Investment Corporation.   |
| 11  | (e) Termination.—The requirements of this section  |
| 12  | shall cease to be effective on December 31, 2026.  |
|   |  |
| 13  | SEC. 304. RECOVERING ASSETS STOLEN FROM THE LIBYAN   |
| <ul><li>13</li><li>14</li></ul>   | SEC. 304. RECOVERING ASSETS STOLEN FROM THE LIBYAN PEOPLE.   |
|   |  |
| 14  | PEOPLE.  |
| 14<br>15  | <b>PEOPLE.</b> (a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Con-  |
| <ul><li>14</li><li>15</li><li>16</li><li>17</li></ul>                       | PEOPLE.  (a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the  |
| <ul><li>14</li><li>15</li><li>16</li><li>17</li></ul>                       | PEOPLE.  (a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Attorney General should, to the extent   |
| 14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18  | PEOPLE.  (a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Attorney General should, to the extent practicable, advance a coordinated international effort—  |
| <ul><li>14</li><li>15</li><li>16</li><li>17</li><li>18</li><li>19</li></ul> | PEOPLE.  (a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Attorney General should, to the extent practicable, advance a coordinated international effort—  (1) to carry out special financial investigations   |
| 14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20                                      | PEOPLE.  (a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Attorney General should, to the extent practicable, advance a coordinated international effort—  (1) to carry out special financial investigations to identify and track assets taken from the people  |
| 14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21                                | PEOPLE.  (a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Attorney General should, to the extent practicable, advance a coordinated international effort—  (1) to carry out special financial investigations to identify and track assets taken from the people and institutions of Libya through theft, corruption,   |
| 14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18<br>19<br>20<br>21<br>22                          | PEOPLE.  (a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Attorney General should, to the extent practicable, advance a coordinated international effort—  (1) to carry out special financial investigations to identify and track assets taken from the people and institutions of Libya through theft, corruption, money laundering, or other illicit means; and |

| 1  | (B) to oversee the assets identified pursu-                |
|----|--|
| 2  | ant to paragraph (1); and                                  |
| 3  | (C) to provide technical assistance to help                |
| 4  | governments establish the necessary legal                  |
| 5  | framework to carry out asset forfeitures.                  |
| 6  | (b) Additional Elements.—The coordinated inter-            |
| 7  | national effort described in subsection (a) should include |
| 8  | input from—  |
| 9  | (1) the Office of Terrorist Financing and Fi-              |
| 10 | nancial Crimes of the Department of the Treasury;          |
| 11 | (2) the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network               |
| 12 | of the Department of the Treasury; and                     |
| 13 | (3) the Money Laundering and Asset Recovery                |
| 14 | Section of the Department of Justice.                      |
| 15 | SEC. 305. AUTHORITY TO EXPAND EDUCATIONAL AND CUL-         |
| 16 | TURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH LIBYA.                        |
| 17 | (a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Con-             |
| 18 | gress that the United States should expand educational     |
| 19 | and cultural exchange programs with Libya to promote       |
| 20 | mutual understanding and people-to-people linkages be-     |
| 21 | tween the United States and Libya.                         |
| 22 | (b) Authority.—The President is authorized to ex-          |
| 23 | pand educational and cultural exchange programs with       |
|    |  |

| 1                                | (1) The J. William Fulbright Educational Ex-  |
|----------------------------------|---|
| 2                                | change Program referred to in paragraph (1) of sec-   |
| 3                                | tion 112(a) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural  |
| 4                                | Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2460(a)).   |
| 5                                | (2) The International Visitors Program referred   |
| 6                                | to in paragraph (3) of such section.  |
| 7                                | (3) The U.SMiddle East Partnership Initiative   |
| 8                                | (MEPI) Student Leaders Program.   |
| 9                                | (4) The Youth Exchange and Study Program.   |
| 10                               | (5) Other related programs administered by the  |
| 11                               | Department of State.  |
|                                  |   |
| 12                               | TITLE IV—DETERMINATION OF   |
| 12<br>13                         | TITLE IV—DETERMINATION OF BUDGETARY EFFECTS   |
|                                  |   |
| 13                               | BUDGETARY EFFECTS   |
| 13<br>14                         | BUDGETARY EFFECTS SEC. 401. DETERMINATION OF BUDGETARY EFFECTS.   |
| 13<br>14<br>15                   | BUDGETARY EFFECTS  SEC. 401. DETERMINATION OF BUDGETARY EFFECTS.  The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of   |
| 13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17       | BUDGETARY EFFECTS  SEC. 401. DETERMINATION OF BUDGETARY EFFECTS.  The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010,   |
| 13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17       | BUDGETARY EFFECTS  SEC. 401. DETERMINATION OF BUDGETARY EFFECTS.  The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, shall be determined by reference to the latest statement titled "Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation" for this   |
| 13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17       | BUDGETARY EFFECTS  SEC. 401. DETERMINATION OF BUDGETARY EFFECTS.  The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, shall be determined by reference to the latest statement titled "Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation" for this   |
| 13<br>14<br>15<br>16<br>17<br>18 | BUDGETARY EFFECTS  SEC. 401. DETERMINATION OF BUDGETARY EFFECTS.  The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, shall be determined by reference to the latest statement titled "Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation" for this Act, submitted for printing in the Congressional Record |